

China's Economic Engagement in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Analysis

Dana M.D. Sajadi¹, Waqar Ahmad²

¹Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Tishk International University, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq

²Department of Business and Management, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Tishk International University, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq

Abstract—The Middle East centers are approached by China and focus on promoting development as a means to address the region's challenges. China's geo-economics strategy for the broader Middle East primarily revolves around an external trade and industrial approach. This approach integrates geopolitical considerations with economic policies, effectively exporting industrial capacities. In essence, it functions as both a geo-industrial policy and a concurrent trade strategy. It offers a developmental model as a blueprint, prioritizes partnerships over alliances, and recognizes a crucial reality. Nonetheless, the instability of the US special program in the Middle East posed a fresh challenge to the future progress of bilateral relations. Importantly, China's Middle East policy has not remained unchanged, its swift adaptations have injected energy into the positive growth of Sino-Arab bilateral relations. As China's involvement in the Arab region and nearby areas grows, so does its influence on the global stage. This is what China seeks to achieve with all its capabilities and potential. The paper seeks to examine the role of China's economic influence on the Middle East.

Keywords—China, Middle East, Trade, Built Road Initiative, Investment, Energy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Many analysts view China's remarkable ascent as a significant economic powerhouse in just three decades as one of the most extraordinary success stories in recent history. Starting from 1979 when economic reforms commenced, China's actual GDP expanded at an average yearly rate of almost 9% (China GDP Annual Growth Rate, n.d.). Approximately 800 million individuals in China have been lifted from extreme poverty thus far, according to estimates. China's ascent has also led to a transformation of the worldwide economy, the global environment, and international politics. At Present, China holds the position as the world's largest economy when considering purchasing power parity, which accounts for price variations among nations, and it ranks as the second-largest economy when evaluated at market exchange rates. Given these capabilities, China embarked on a reconfiguration of its foreign policy, aiming to establish influence and robust connections with various regions worldwide.

China is pursuing a foreign policy aimed at preserving its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. It strives to create favorable global conditions for its openness, reform, and endeavors, as well as to play a role in promoting global peace and mutual prosperity. The key components of this

policy include maintaining an independent foreign approach, not aligning with any prominent nation or coalition, proactively engaging in international collaborations, avoiding taking sides with any major nation or bloc, opposing the tendency of hegemony in international relations seeking to create a multipolar world, and calling for equality between all the states fair distribution of power and the necessity of a peaceful solution. To resolve disputes and conflicts between countries through negotiation, rather than resorting to or threatening force. Considering the shifts in political events and the regional and global transformations that have occurred in the Arab region, it is certain that China wants to achieve significant political and economic objectives in the Middle East, especially as the region grapples with crises and upheaval.

This is happening in the context of the U.S. policies falling short in addressing these problems such as the outbreak of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian conflict, which lacks a clear endpoint. Through this research, we delve into the multifaceted nature of Chinese–Arab relations, emphasizing China's expanding influence, primarily through its economic prowess and soft power. We examine that it is evolving connections with Middle Eastern

nations, taking into account the recent changes in the region's political and international landscape.

This exploration aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between China and the Middle East, shedding light on the dynamics that shape their interactions in the contemporary world.

The research methodology employed for this study relies on a thorough analysis of secondary data to comprehensively explore China's Economic Engagement in the Middle East. The research draws on a diverse range of secondary data resources, including academic journals, reports, books, government publications, and reputable online databases. The study adopts a descriptive approach, presenting findings based on the analysis of existing secondary data rather than primary data collection. The wealth of information derived from various sources, such as economic reports, trade statistics, and scholarly articles, contributes to a nuanced understanding of the economic dynamics between China and Middle Eastern countries. The secondary data encompassed in this study offers insights into trade patterns, investment trends, and broader economic relationships, enabling a comprehensive and informed analysis of China's economic engagement in the Middle East.

II. THE SINO-ARAB RELATIONS

The Middle East, historically a significant arena for power struggles and rivalry, became one of its focal points. China modified its foreign policy by avoiding and removing the influence of the "Ultra-Leftist" ideology from the 1960s. By doing so, it enhanced or forged friendly relations with Middle Eastern countries. In this particular instance, China established diplomatic relations with Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and Lebanon. Marking a significant advancement in its diplomatic ties with Arab nations. In the 1980s, China's adoption of the reform and opening-up strategy, which had a strong emphasis on economic growth, marked a departure from the practice of creating divisions between China and nations having distinct ideologies or social systems. As a result, Sino-Arab relations entered a fresh phase of growth. During the 1980s, the UAE, Palestine, Qatar, and Bahrain initiated diplomatic relations with China. Saudi Arabia also joined in 1990. By that time, China had established diplomatic ties with every Arab nation (MAZEL, 2022). Gaining diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia, a highly influential player in the Arab-Islamic sphere, marked a significant accomplishment in China's Middle East diplomatic efforts. Sino-Arab interactions and connections have grown increasingly active and intimate. In January 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed four guiding principles for enhancing Sino-Arab relations during a meeting with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and representatives from the 22 member states. They mutually decided to establish the China-Arab Cooperation Forum and inaugurate a fresh form of partnership between China and the Arab world (Li Zhaoxing Attends the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, 2004). In addition, the increasing involvement of China in

the Middle East can be seen as a direct result of alterations in Beijing's approach to foreign policy and security. Even Mao Zedong's military strategy, which involved tactics such as "Where the enemy advances, we retreat. Where the enemy retreats, we pursue," might remain applicable in this context (Sun, 2013). However, with successive leaders, China's foreign and security strategy has gradually transformed. The arrival of the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, signified a shift away from the "low profile" policy that Deng Xiaoping had advocated for (Defense, 2008). This marks the beginning of a new era in which China is assuming a more prominent role and actively contributing to the betterment of humanity.

From the onset of China's emergence as a global power, the Middle East has fostered highly favorable economic, technological, and developmental ties with China. These connections can be aptly characterized as exceptional. In the past decade, China has taken the lead as the primary provider of foreign investments in the Middle East. It has also solidified its role as a key economy for numerous Gulf countries, first and foremost Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Beijing required oil and gas to power its swift economic expansion and secure its position as the world's leading exporter of goods. Simultaneously, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf sought export earnings to fund the diversification of their economies. China progressively emerged as the top consumer of Saudi crude oil. Furthermore, it stands as the primary trading partner for the Saudi chemical sector. As per Chinese reports, during the initial 10 months of 2022, oil imports from Saudi Arabia amounted to 1.77 million barrels daily (Bonesh, 2023).

III. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

The Belt and Road Initiative, often referred to as the New Chinese Silk Road, stands out as one of the most significant and noteworthy projects of the 21st century. In 2013, Chinese President Xi introduced an extensive, enduring strategic endeavor. The primary objective of this project is to establish connections between China and regions such as Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe through two primary routes: one over land and the other by maritime (Zou et al., 2022). The Belt refers to the Overland Silk Road Economic Belt, an extensive network that extends from China, linking it to Central Asian countries, Russia, Turkey, Europe, and the Mediterranean. As for the road, meaning the Maritime Silk Road for the 21st Century, this involves establishing a maritime network to connect the Chinese coastline with Europe through southern China, the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea. It also encompasses a route that stretches to the African coast, as well as connecting the Chinese coast with Southeast Asia and the Pacific region (Yilmaz, 2018).

In addition, the project encompasses the development of road networks, railways, electricity grids, oil and gas pipelines, Internet, and a range of infrastructure systems. Moreover, the establishment of new institutions as alternatives to global governance bodies exerts pressure on existing

ones. Examples include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, often referred to as a worldwide bank for Asia, and the New Development Bank, commonly known as BRICS, along with the Silk Road Fund (Rana, 2019). The Belt and Road Initiative creates a fresh opportunity for collaboration between China and Middle Eastern nations, opening doors to the growth of their relationships. This initiative has become the main driver of Chinese domestic policy, diplomacy, and its foreign affairs. It aligns with China's soft power approach, reflecting the nation's remarkable economic growth, which has raised political and security concerns among regional and global actors.

On the global scale, the initiative holds a worldwide scope and far-reaching aspirations. This significant strategic and geopolitical strategy emerged from China's recognition of the value placed on its pivotal role within the theories of geopolitical thinkers. One notable theory is the spymen theory, which emphasizes the significance of peripheral countries and their proximity to China. It pointed out that these regions are often situated along coastlines and near seas and straits, which played a role in China's revival of the Ancient Silk Road. Furthermore, this theory highlighted China's utilization of sea routes, as evidenced by its economic initiative for the New Silk Road "the belt and road initiative" (Liu, 2022).

China, through the Belt and Road Initiative, endeavors to evolve from an agrarian society into a more technologically advanced civilization with a strong presence in the realms of industry and information. This includes extending Chinese institutions overseas and integrating them with local infrastructures both within Chinese regions and along the Belt and Road pathways. This approach reflects China's commitment to sidestep military conflicts, prioritizing the peaceful coexistence ethos and fostering opportunities for development. China, as the second largest energy consumer globally after the United States, has been driven to explore both domestic and international solutions to address its energy demands; therefore, China has taken proactive moves on several fronts to diversify its sources of energy, with a particular focus on the Middle East region. By enhancing its collaborations with energy-producing nations, exploring untapped reserves, overseeing existing ones, and actively participating in their growth and enhancement.

Some Chinese scholars propose directing attention to oil-rich Arab states in the Persian Gulf. This perspective is rooted in recognizing the crucial role of energy supplies as a primary catalyst for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The notion is that such a concentration could foster lasting mutual trust and interdependence between China and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Alternatively, other Chinese scholars argue that China should concentrate on major regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (Li and Hilmola, 2019). In addition, some of the biggest oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, rely heavily on China as their primary trade partner, with more than 40% of its crude oil exports directed toward Beijing. In a substantial move, Chinese authorities finalized agreements of substantial value in December 2022 while in Saudi Arabia. This resulted in the creation of an

extensive cooperation plan, consisting of 182 joint initiatives spanning politics, the economy, trade, and investment across 18 sectors. This underscores a considerable level of interest in China emanating from the region (Garlik, 2023). In the same region, the United Arab Emirates is strengthening its energy partnership with China. A significant development occurred in March 2023 with the agreement to export natural gas in yuan currency signed between Beijing and Abu Dhabi, this comes shortly after Beijing's substantial \$60 billion deal with Qatar for LNG imports in November 2022 signifying a crucial advancement in the strategic energy collaboration between the Middle East and China.

Moreover, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, based in Beijing, extended its global footprint by inaugurating its first international office in Abu Dhabi in April 2023. The primary goal is to actively contribute to the goals of diverse multilateral initiatives, establishing the office as a pivotal and strategic hub (Zoubir, 2023). In Iraq, the engagement with China goes beyond energy imports to encompass infrastructure projects. Several projects are currently under construction, indicating that the relationship between the two is not exclusively built on commercial and economic connections. China, being a substantial investor in the region, prioritizes energy projects and investments.

Furthermore, the Belt and Road initiative provides a substantial opportunity for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC). Due to the decline in oil prices since 2014 and the decreased dependence of major oil-consuming Western nations such as the United States and Canada on Middle Eastern oil, the GCC has redirected its focus toward economically emerging countries in the East, such as India and China, for their oil exports. While China is exploring alternative energy sources, its current energy needs will not diminish immediately. Therefore, ensuring long-term, dependable energy security is mutually beneficial for both China and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

In addition, China seeks to approach the Middle East and especially the GCC countries form, a bilateral approach as was mentioned in the China-Arab Forum in 2014 that was held in the Chinese capital. President Xi put forward the principles of "Consultation, Contribution, and Shared Benefits" (China.org, 2014). The Chinese president presented a plan that focuses on three dimensions which are constructed as a 1+2+3 cooperation framework, concentrating on enhancing collaboration in the energy sector as the central aspect, while also emphasizing infrastructure development and streamlining trade and investment. In addition, seeking advancements in three emerging high-tech domains: Nuclear energy, aerospace satellites, and new energy sources. The essence of this plan which was later called the China-Arab policy paper, both parties should focus on building a comprehensive industrial energy chain, securing energy transport routes, establishing strategic cooperative alliances in the energy sector, and enhancing people's well-being through improved infrastructure and economic development.

Certain Chinese scholars have noted that Middle Eastern countries that are rich in energy resources are facing a critical need for economic diversification. This involves

addressing challenges such as the dominance of state-owned sectors hindering the growth of private enterprises, excessive dependence on foreign labor, and inadequate infrastructure (Chengzhang, 2018) (Wang et al., 2021). Economic diversification has become a pressing concern in the Arab Gulf countries. Especially the global economic downturn induced by the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a drop in Brent crude prices, this has put significant pressure on the financial positions of the GCC countries, in addition to that, the GCC has been grappling with the longevity of their earnings from oil and gas for many years. Over time, the reserves of oil and gas are expected to run out. Hence, they tended toward broadening their economies by fostering industries beyond oil and gas. Nevertheless, economic activities in the private sector within the GCC countries continue to heavily rely on consumption and projects funded by the government, ultimately sustained by revenues from oil and gas.

As a result, the BRI has advanced and created a foundation for collaboration in alignment with numerous national strategies in GCC states, including Saudi Vision 2030, Qatar National Vision 2030, UAE National Development and Vision 2021, and New Kuwait. All these strategies prioritize economic prosperity, development, and the enhancement of infrastructure and well-being, with China poised to play a central role as the primary contributor and partner in achieving these objectives in the fields of economy, trade, energy, and infrastructure. Hence, China will attain additional geopolitical goals, expanding its influence in the region, and gradually displacing or diminishing the American influence in a manner that no longer significantly impacts its interests in that area.

Similarly, in the case of Iran and Turkey, their bilateral ties with China appear promising. Iran's significance to the Belt and Road Initiative is underscored by its strategic location, serving as a corridor connecting China to the European market. Moreover, Iran boasts a reasonably developed transportation infrastructure network, contributing to the smooth functioning of the BRI with fewer obstacles. This infrastructure is operational, eliminating the need for China to invest significant amounts in rebuilding it from the ground up, thus saving both time and costs. Moreover, Iran possesses substantial natural resources, including oil and gas. Add to that Iran suffered under the economic and political challenges that were followed by the American sanctions, especially when it was resumed by the Trump administration, have placed Iran under significant strain. In response to this isolation Iran moved to the east aiming for closer ties with China as a potential partner on all scales, through the BRI, China has undertaken essential investments to alleviate Iran's challenges, a substitute for the Western market and an escape plan to circumvent the heavy sanctions that stumbled the Iranian economy for several years, even though these actions are sometimes perceived as tough negotiations.

Regarding Turkey, it holds an importance comparable to Iran, particularly due to the mutually desired partnership between China and Turkey. Turkey has consistently pursued a pragmatic approach in its foreign policy, seeking to diversify its partners based on its own strategic interests. Although

Turkey is considered the second largest power in NATO and maintains several ties with the West, yet this did not prevent it from forming partnerships with other major powers such as Russia and China, which are both considered rivals to the Western powers, especially the United States. Recently, Turkey has been turning its attention eastward, aiming to reduce its reliance on NATO, particularly given criticism from some NATO members regarding Turkey's positions on Syria and human rights abuses. In addition to that, the West punished Turkey and imposed sanctions despite its crucial role in NATO as the second largest power in the alliance, while China recognized the significance of Turkey in the trans-Caspian corridor, establishing vital connections to European markets.

China's inclination toward establishing an economic trade route to Europe through Turkey was evident back in 2010. At that time, China initiated a trilateral discussion involving Bulgaria and Turkey to explore the feasibility of a high-speed Asia-Europe railway connecting Edirne in western Turkey to Bulgaria's capital, Sofia (Novinite, 2010). This highlights that Turkey's engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative is not solely driven by economic considerations but, more importantly, by the quest for alternative economic and strategic allies beyond traditional partners such as Germany and the United States. Such a diversification would afford Turkey greater policy latitude and flexibility both regionally and globally. Simultaneously, this strategic move supports and fortifies China's economic framework. Crucially, this enables both nations to enhance their ties without provoking direct resistance from the United States. The U.S. and its NATO allies find it challenging to object to increased global trade and investment connections, leaving them somewhat powerless as their influence over a renegade NATO ally diminishes.

This underscores China's excessive use of soft power as a primary tool to influence Middle Eastern countries to align with its interests, as a component of Chinese foreign policy, the emphasis is on development and economic prosperity in collaboration with partners, avoiding interference in domestic affairs and political regimes. This approach is appealing to many states, especially in the global south, creating a mutually beneficial situation for both sides.

A. China's Influence in the Middle East


Comparing the influence of America and China in the Middle East is challenging because they operate on completely different levels. China prefers the term "Western Asia" for the region, covering the Levant, Iraq, the Gulf, Turkey, and Iran, rather than using the conventional "Middle East" label. Despite China's ambitious naval development, it is not anticipated to rival America's dominance at sea within any foreseeable timeframe. In addition, there is no indication that China currently has or will soon acquire the capability to deploy ground forces in the region. China has significantly increased its economic and technological influence over the past few years. The United States faces challenges in competing with China, particularly in crucial domains such as broadband infrastructure.

The military situation in the Middle East involving China is limited. China maintains a relatively modest military presence in the region, with approximately 200 Marines stationed at the Djibouti naval base. These forces are primarily designated for anti-piracy and civilian rescue operations. Despite reports of China endorsing a joint maritime force that includes nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Oman, there is no indication that China has committed any ships to this collaborative initiative. An analysis from the American Enterprise Institute in February 2013 notes that China's current basing capacity and force commitment in the region may not be sufficient to sustain the level of economic and diplomatic engagement that Beijing appears to be adopting as its new normal. As a result, the analysis suggests that Washington should be prepared for the potential further expansion of China's military presence in the Middle East.

Speculation has circulated regarding the possibility of a Chinese naval base in the UAE, but official confirmation is still pending. The latest assessment from the Pentagon indicates no immediate plans for China to expand its military capabilities beyond its borders. In terms of personnel, China has approximately 30,000 marines and 12,000 special forces, significantly fewer than the United States, which boasts 200,000 marines and 70,000 special forces.

In August 2014, President Barack Obama criticized China for its benefits as a "free rider" in the Persian Gulf, enjoying the protection of shipping lanes provided by the U.S. Navy without contributing proportionally to the costs. This critique remains valid, considering China's substantial increase in military spending while maintaining minimal commitments to the Middle East. At present, China is more of an observer, capitalizing on the U.S. commitment to securing crucial sea routes. While there is speculation that China might step in if the U.S. reduces its commitment to protecting these shipping lanes, this is merely conjecture at this point. At present, China is primarily focusing its military resources on coastal defense, emphasizing technologies such as medium- and long-range missiles, the J-20 interceptor, satellites, electronic warfare, and submarines.

B. Economic Balance



Sources: China Customs

At the close of 2022 and the commencement of 2023, China's exports to Saudi Arabia reached an annual rate of approximately US\$45 billion, marking a two-fold increase from the pre-COVID volume. In stark contrast, European Union exports to Saudi Arabia, which peaked at \$45 billion in 2014, experienced a decline, reaching only \$33 billion in 2022. Similarly, U.S. exports, reaching their zenith at \$19 billion in 2015, dwindled to \$11.5 billion by 2022. Notably, China has now surpassed both the United States and Europe, emerging as the primary supplier of industrial goods to Saudi Arabia, spanning telecom infrastructure, solar power, mass transit, and other advanced technologies. Chinese exports to Israel witnessed a doubling between 2018 and 2021, and they have maintained a consistent level since, although still considerably lower than Europe's exports. Intriguingly, China's exports to Iran represent a minute fraction of their 2014 levels, potentially reflecting the impact of sanctions imposed on Iran.

Equally noteworthy is the substantial increase in Chinese exports to Turkey and Central Asia, nearly tripling from levels before the COVID-19 pandemic. This surge can be attributed to various factors, including Turkey's role as an intermediary between China and Russia, particularly for goods subject to sanctions.

C. Why China Approach Middle East Changing?

China's approach to the Middle East has experienced notable changes, reflecting evolving geopolitical, profitable, and strategic considerations. Several factors contribute to this shift in China's approach.

1. **Profitable Expansion and Diversification:** China's rapid-fire profitable growth has needed diversification of its energy sources and requests. The Middle East, rich in oil painting and natural gas reserves, serves as a pivotal region for China's energy security. As China seeks to reduce its dependence on many suppliers, it engages further proactively with Middle Eastern countries to secure energy coffers
2. **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):** The ambitious BRI, aiming to enhance connectivity and cooperation between countries, has urged China to strengthen its ties with the Middle East. The region plays a strategic part in BRI, offering openings for structure development, trade routes, and profitable hookups
3. **Political Stability and Conflict Resolution:** China recognizes the significance of political stability in the Middle East for its profitable interests. By engaging diplomatically and investing in conflict resolution sweats, China aims to produce a conducive terrain for its profitable enterprise and cover its investments in the region
4. **International Trade Openings:** The Middle East is demanding more from China to fulfill the demand of its country and to maintain good relations for future prospects. Therefore, China is maintaining the demand for its products and services
5. **Collaboration in Technology and Innovation:** China is trying for more opportunities to collaborate with Middle East nations and create various memorandums with various

industries such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and telecommunications for lucrative growth

6. Political Power and International Status: China's increased political involvement in the Middle East supports its larger goal of improving its status globally. China aggressively engages in indigenous issues in an effort to influence opinions across the world and create alliances that further its geopolitical objectives
7. Security enterprises: China's trade channels, financial investments, and institutional frameworks are becoming increasingly secure due to its alluring interests. China can address security issues by engaging with the Middle Eastern countries.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

China's changing approach to the Middle East is a multifaceted response to its evolving profitable, political, and security precedence. The region's significance in terms of energy coffers, profitable openings, and geopolitical stability has led China to recalibrate its strategy and consolidate its engagement with Middle Eastern countries.

China's shifting approach to the Middle East can be attributed to multifaceted factors. Originally, China's rapid-fire profitable growth and the imperative to diversify energy sources have driven a reevaluation of its connections with Middle Eastern nations (Smith, 2020). The Middle East, with its abundant oil painting and gas reserves, has become pivotal for China's energy security. Furthermore, the BRI has surfaced as a significant motorist, egging China to consolidate profitable ties and structure systems in the region (Wang and Zhang, 2019). The BRI's emphasis on connectivity aligns with China's broader strategy of enhancing global trade links. Political stability is another factor shaping China's Middle East policy. Feting the significance of stability for its profitable interests, China has decreasingly engaged in political sweat and peace enterprise, aiming to produce a conducive terrain for its profitable enterprise (Luo and Li, 2018). Furthermore, the Middle East is not simply viewed as a source of raw accouterments but as a burgeoning request. China's profitable strategy now encompasses gaining request access and exploring trade openings beyond resource birth (Zheng, 2017).

In the realm of technology and invention, China has pursued collaboration with Middle Eastern countries, particularly in sectors such as telecommunications, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence (Wu and Chen, 2021). These hookups not only foster profitable growth but also contribute to China's technological advancement. China's enhanced political engagement in the Middle East aligns with its broader ambition to strengthen global influence (Li, 2019).

Active participation in indigenous affairs allows China to shape transnational narratives and make hookups that reverberate with its strategic interests. Furthermore, as China expands its profitable footmark encyclopedically, icing the security of its investments, trade routes, and structure

systems becomes imperative (Liao and Wang, 2018). Robust engagement with the Middle East serves as a means to address security enterprises and safeguard China's means in the region. In conclusion, China's evolving approach to the Middle East is a dynamic response to a convergence of profitable, political, and security considerations. The region's significance in terms of energy coffers, profitable openings, and geopolitical stability has urged China to recalibrate its strategy and consolidate its engagement, reflecting a nuanced understanding of its changing global part.

China's active participation in the Middle East reflects a strategic agenda driven by strategic goals, policies, and initiatives. As China emerges as a global player, the Middle East has become a key area in the pursuit of energy security, economic expansion, and global governance.

The BRI plays an important role in improving connectivity and infrastructure as a basis for promoting political stability, opportunities, and economic prosperity. The BRI is an ambitious effort to promote development and connectivity. Technology interoperability, access to resources, and political stability are three key issues. Among the considerations is the importance of strategic planning based on available resources. In line with its geopolitical location in the Middle East, China should expand its international goals and promote international dialog. As China changes its geopolitical strategy, its importance in the Middle East continues to decline.

Nonetheless, China's rethought strategy demonstrates its awareness of the importance of the region and its own national development. Researchers, politicians, and anyone else trying to understand the complexities of today's international relations may find this study useful. In addition, complicated links between China and the Middle East are revealed. China displaces itself in the Middle East. All the variables that could affect the change were examined and analyzed. Midwest was the most prominent environmentalist in the Chicago area. Subsequent changes in resource control and cooperation in technology focused on profitable diversification.

In the framework of the BRI, the economic and institutional distance between Germany and the Middle East has increased. At the moment, the sector functions as a source of resources and a crucial supplier in the field of technical cooperation. His stronger leadership style has led to China's foreign policy becoming more and more focused. The present study broadens the discourse on the international relations of China and clarifies its contextual background. These studies are very important for lawmakers, scientists, and other interested people who want to understand, differently, China's importance to the world and its global activities. As a result, a stagnant economy. As China calls on the world, the relationship with the Middle East is an important part of the foreign policy of the country. China's ever-increasing role in global affairs shows the complexity of the concept, encompassing political, technological, and security challenges. This study provides an understanding of the institutional relationship between China and the Middle East that has developed. It is the basis of the current

international relations debate. With the changing political geographies, this analysis provides valuable insights to those policymakers, academics, and stakeholders seeking to understand the relationship and China's strategic value in the Middle East.

A. Recommendations

Based on a detailed analysis of the development of China-Thailand relations in the Middle East, the recommendations provide practical guidance for policymakers, companies, and stakeholders in a changing environment.

1. Policymakers should promote mutual cooperation between China and the Middle East. By exploring opportunities beyond traditional sectors such as energy, countries in the region can leverage China's growing economic influence for institutional prosperity
2. Strengthening political relations between China and the Middle East should be a priority. Expanding dialog, conflict resolution, and political cooperation can contribute to regional stability and create conditions for sustainable economic participation
3. Governments and companies in the Middle East should immediately explore the possibility of technical and creative cooperation with China. Financial cooperation, scientific cooperation, and knowledge exchange can support joint development and make the region a center of technological development
4. As China emphasizes infrastructure development through initiatives such as the BRI Middle Eastern countries must develop strategies to align their infrastructure with China's priorities. It promotes communication, trade, and economic development
5. All actors, including government and industry, must be aware of the security risks associated with China's economic development. Reliable risk assessments and security partnerships can protect investments and ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure
6. Middle East countries can cooperate with China on issues of climate change, sustainable development, and health in international forums, including international conferences and meetings. This collaborative approach has the potential to improve cooperation and maximize the benefits of global participation
7. Governments and educational institutions should promote increased educational and artistic exchanges between China and the Middle East. Erecting a better understanding of each other's societies and values can foster long-name people-to-people connections, contributing to stronger bilateral relations
8. Feting China's commitment to environmental sustainability, Middle Eastern countries should explore openings for collaboration in renewable energy and environmental enterprise. This not only aligns with global precedence but also positions the region as a crucial player in sustainable development
9. Policymakers in both China and the Middle East should borrow flexible policy responses that can acclimatize to

changing geopolitical and profitable conditions. Regular reassessment of strategies ensures a dynamic approach to the evolving relationship

10. Governments, businesses, and civil society should prioritize public mindfulness juggernauts to inform their separate populations about the benefits, challenges, and openings associated with China's adding presence. Transparent communication can alleviate misconceptions and make public support.

These recommendations are adapted to foster mutually helpful and sustainable cooperation between China and the Middle East, admitting the evolving nature of their profitable, political, and technological relations. Perpetration of these recommendations requires cooperative sweat and a forward-looking approach to navigate the complications of an ever-changing global geography.

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