Interrogating Governance Challenges and Cadre Deployment in South Africa

Victor H. Mlambo[1], Sphephelo P. Zubane[2], Xolani Thusi[3]

[1]University of Johannesburg, School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy,
Johannesburg, South Africa
[2]Department of History, University of Zululand, Richards Bay,
South Africa
[3]Department of Public Administration, University of Zululand, Richards Bay,
South Africa

Abstract—This paper examines whether cadre deployment which is an ANC policy has an effect on governance/service delivery in South Africa. The former Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Dr. Zweli Mkhize, painted a bleak picture about the state of local government. The minister stated that 87 municipalities – about a third of South Africa's total of 257 – remain dysfunctional or distressed. Underpinning this dysfunctionality was mismanagement due to political instability or interference, corruption, and incompetence, often resulting in poor service delivery, thus prolonging the periods of underdevelopment and poor access to basic services. This paper argues that cadre deployment in part contributes to the dysfunctionality of public institutions which are mandated to deliver services to the people, thus the domino effect has been riots, protests, and wasteful expenditure, especially at a local government level. This results in participatory exclusion when it comes to collective development. To answer the guiding questions of this paper, a qualitative research approach was adopted where the review of the literature was undertaken to gather the data needed. Findings revealed that the quest for effective governance and consistent service delivery in South Africa's public sector is dependent on the availability of competent staff that possesses the required skills. It was revealed that cadre deployment promotes a culture of impunity and the lack of accountability, thus undermining the functioning of the public, thus contributing to a breakdown of governance and service delivery and this will have widespread implications for inclusive development and poverty eradication in the country.

Keywords—Cadre deployment, Corruption, Development, Implications, Local government.

I. Introduction

The end of Apartheid in South Africa and the subsequent emergence of the African National Congress (ANC) as the ruling party brought with it four major objectives. First, there was a need to uplift the socioeconomic status of the previously disadvantaged groups (Indians, Blacks, and Colored's) who were sidelined by the apartheid regime. Second, there was a need to reinvent South Africa's image in the global arena, an image that would resemble tolerance, healing, and inclusivity. Third, significant efforts needed to be undertaken to position South Africa as a key partner for Africa, in essence, South Africa had a role play in ensuring the collective development of the continent (Miller et al., 2008). Finally, there was a need for incoming leaders to forge internal unity in the country, to heal past wounds and ensure that the diversity of the country contributes toward its development. Achieving these objectives would be easier said than done as there were considerable challenges that the incoming government had to overcome. For example, forging unity was always going to be a challenge, eliminating racist and xenophobic sentiments were always going to prove difficult due to the socioeconomic alienation experienced by Black people under the apartheid regime (Resane, 2021). Nonetheless, the ANC was determined to consolidate the concept of togetherness to such as extent that the term Rainbow nation[1] coined by Anglican bishop Desmond Tutu became been a key ingredient in the ANC's drive to forge unity (Bouckaert, 1997). The end of apartheid and subsequent rule of the ANC was met with jubilation, it was hoped that a black-led government would better understand the plight of Black people and would be ideal

---

1   Rainbow Nation was described by Tutu to encapsulate the unity of multi-culturalism and diversity of South African people

in the quest to emancipate them from poverty. Governance in post-apartheid South Africa has been characterized by a mix of positive and negative observations. On a positive, the South African government says that 3.2 million homes were built from 1994 to 2018 (BBC News, 2019), the Department of Education has built 153 primary schools and 128 secondary schools (South African Government, 2014). From 1994, university enrolment has almost doubled in size, increasing from 495,356 in 1994 in universities, including technikons and teacher training colleges – to 938,201 in 2011 in public universities and universities of technology (South African News, 2014). Finally, to address the past economic injustices and reduce poverty, social grants have been seen as an ideal policy, and thus, the number of social grants in South Africa has increased exponentially over the past 23 years: From an estimated 4 million in 1994 to 17,443,994 by October 2017 (Brown and Roman, 2019). However, despite such positives, the ANC's rule has not all been positive, issues of corruption have become the norm and well entrenched in the public sector (Bauer, 2000, and Mantzaris, 2017), the difficulty in diversifying economic development and creating employment, internal politics within the ANC, the lack of concrete policies to address crime, the decay of state-owned enterprises (Mavuso, 2020), the disintegration of local government, and failure to address the unsustainable public sector wage bill are issues which have become an impediment to development post-1994. To consolidate power and have control over key decisions taken in the public sector, the ANC's cadre deployment policy (later discussed in this paper) has been key, especially in placing loyal individuals in key public sector positions. However, critics of this policy argue that deployed individuals tend to be more loyal to the party rather than to consider the interest of the public. However, the ANC has argued that the policy is important in ensuring that deployed individuals perform optimally and under the watchful eye of the party. It has been argued both in academia and political spectrum that the shortcomings demonstrated in the government departments and state-owned enterprises are a result of the ANC's cadre deployment programme, where incompetent and unqualified individuals are deployed to strategic positions primarily, if not mainly on the basis of loyalty to the party. Hoffman (2013) argues that the policy creates room for corruption, lack of accountability, and transparency and also reduces the effectiveness and impartiality of the public sector. While ANC has defended the policy, from a public point of view, cadre deployment breeds corruption and the abuse of power. With the above, this paper seeks to answer the following questions; to what extent has cadre deployment undermined the public's trust in the government/ public institutions? Why is cadre deployment so important for the ANC and finally, does cadre deployment give way to party loyalty over governance, accountability, and service delivery?

II. Literature Review

A. The Concept of Cadre Deployment and Reasoning Behind It

According to Cheeseman et al. (2019), cadre deployment is the placement of a cadre to a post within a government organization to circumvent the bureaucracy and put the organization under the party's control. Pattillo (2012) defines cadre deployment as the placement of committed members of the ruling party in critical positions to strengthen the party's power and influence. Mkhongi (2013) argued that the ANC uses the phrase cadre policy or deployment with the notion that the power of any revolutionary organization is determined not only by its numbers but also by the quality of its cadres. Shava and Chamisa (2018) argued that cadre deployment pushed for the appointment of ANC party loyalists to high-ranking positions in the public sector. This political favoritism, which was carried out through state positions, resulted in poor performance in government institutions and the country as a whole. The politics-administration dichotomy theory argues that for an effective and efficient public service, there is a need for administrative decisions to be free of political interference and such decisions need to reflect the needs of society rather than those of political parties. In essence, while political parties may voice their opinions regarding governance issues, their opinions should not automatically lead to administrative decisions being taken in support of their opinions. However, this paper also argues that it is difficult if not impossible to separate politics from administration as they complement each other in a way. However, there is a need to ensure the presence of checks and balances in the public sector to ensure that politics does not compromise administrative decisions to benefit a few. Jankielsohn and Mollentze (2021) stated that the cadre approach has made it easier to put party and frequently factional supporters in positions of power. This has the potential to contribute to state resources being used to benefit the party, at the expense of service delivery. du Toit and de Jager (2014) contended that the ANC's cadre deployment plan has created a huge patronage network in which ANC members are granted important positions in the public sector, blurring the distinctions between the state, the government, and the party. Ministers, rather than director-general (public employees), appoint departmental executives, bolstering political, and executive control of the public sector. Accessibility to the government and its resources is limited to being able to provide positions and power (self-regarding) in exchange for political allegiance under such a patronage system, which is generated through cadre deployment and a belief in controlling all centers of power. Sebake and Sebola (2014) pointed out that in South Africa, cadre deployment leads to inadequate performance, nepotism, and bad service delivery. Magomane (2012) stated that cadre deployment is an ANC strategy that cannot be disregarded; however, its implementation has drawn a lot of criticism from multiple facades. The ANC together with its alliance partners has long advocated for safe and trusted party hands to be put on all of society's "levers of power." This paper is of the view that the failure to separate politics from administrative decisions has impeded the effective functioning of the public sector and has given rise to cronyism, impunity, and poor levels of accountability, thus neglecting the needs of society. However, while it would be ideal to separate politics from administrative decisions, in developing countries, politics is greatly intertwined with the public sector and thus achieving

the total separation of the two is highly impossible. The deployment of cadres for political purposes, in which the deployed cadres carry out the party's mission, has been a source of worry, particularly in light of the deteriorating levels of service delivery. Regardless of the criticism, the ANC persists in stationing cadres in key positions, including the diplomatic service. du Toit and de Jager (2014) indicated that unfortunately, the ANC's so-called cadre deployment policy sometimes comes at the expense of other needs, such as impartiality. While the goal of this strategy is to promote inclusive demographic representation, the ANC tweaks it by utilizing the party's power of assignment, as well as informal influence, to install ANC party supporters in critical positions throughout the state. Although the exact electoral benefit received by the ANC as a result of this strategy is not readily observable, it must be regarded as a critical component in determining the nature of the party's dominance.

Regrettably, Kanyane (2014) indicated that the ANC's cadre deployment prioritizes allegiance above merit and even competence and is thus a significant impediment to the deliverance of effective services. People who are politically linked and, in many circumstances, inept are placed in top positions. Consequently, unqualified and incompetent individuals are unable to provide services in a timely and effective manner. Jankielsohn and Mollentze (2021) indicated that following former President Thabo Mbeki's loss at the 2007 Polokwane convention, then – ANC President Jacob Zuma utilized the deployment committees to replace employees at all branches of administration and on the ANC's electoral lists. The difficulty with this factional strategy was that many of the cadres selected lacked the requisite skills, which led to a surge in cronyism and corruption. Qobo (2019) pointed out that the ANC's cadre strategic plan was oblivious to the fact that the party's skilled labor was limited, and the party's ideological rhetoric has not always been practical in the face of difficult policy decisions. As a result, the party served as an anchor around the neck of the government's institutional modernization, stifling long-term policy innovation. Evidence showing more than half of municipal managers are not competent for their jobs verified the state's institutional degradation through cadre deployment. Cadre placement goes against the principles of the Public Services Amendment Bill and is opposed to good and effective governance standards. The continued politicization of the public sector through cadre deployment in many respects undermines good governance practice for service delivery in the country. According to Maqoko and Asmah-Andoh (2019), the degradation of the local government sector has been seen as a direct result of nepotism, cronyism, and cadre deployment by the ANC. Effective public sector governance requires a good political-administrative relationship within the public sector. The presence of this will enhance public service delivery and the fulfillment the National Development Plan's Vision 2030.

B. The Cost of Cadre Deployment on Governance in Local Municipalities

Since its adoption by the ANC in 1998, it is justifiable to argue that cadre deployment policy has done more harm than good concerning ethical governance. A study by Shava and Chamisa (2018) confirmed that cadre deployment exacerbated problems related to corruption, poor procurement systems, wasteful expenditure, and the deteriorating state of local government. Noting the scourge of cadre deployment within government institutions, Professor Chris Landsberg, the head of the Politics and Foreign Policy Department at the University of Johannesburg, cited the need to depoliticize and professionalize the diplomatic services. Magomane (2012) argued that the impact of cadre deployment is further aggravated by cronyism, nepotism, and political interference in the appointment of people in strategic positions, especially in the local government sector. This, however, is not a phenomenon unique to local government but could be found throughout all spheres of government. It could be argued that the failures of the ruling party on basic service delivery expectations could be attributed to cadre deployments. While this could be partially correct, in some respects, it would be dangerous to posit that cadre deployment is solely responsible for 27 years of inadequate service delivery in South Africa. In this regard, the impact of cadre deployment could be understood within the prism of the following misfortunes, irregular expenditure, unauthorized expenditure, and wasteful expenditures within governance.

In 2014–2015, the auditor general financial (Kimi Makwetu) revealed that there has been an irregular expenditure of R25.7bn across the country's national and provincial departments and public entities for the 2014–2015 years (Fin24, 2015). The local government sector has been the hardest hit concerning irregular expenditure with the auditor general revealing that irregular expenditure by municipalities increased by more than 50% in the 2015/2016 financial year to a whopping R16.8 billion from the previous year. In the auditor general consolidated audit reports for 2015/2016, there was a massive R65.5 billion of "irregular" and "wasteful" expenditure by all spheres of government in South Africa, together with 10 of the 21 state-owned enterprises (Tickle, 2018). In 2017, there was a slight decrease from R65.5 billion to R51 billion. In the period 2018/19, R4,16 billion of government expenditure was reported as fruitless and wasteful.

The AGSA also highlighted that more than 50% of national departments lacked good governance, leadership, oversight, and performance management, and this often led to poor planning and expenditure. Consequently, various governance and service delivery challenges have resulted from cadre deployment policies that negatively affect the performance of municipalities and government departments. These challenges include a lack of transparency and accountability, financial mismanagement, corruption, fraud, and generally poor performance (Shava and Chamisa, 2018). This means that under the auspices of cadre deployment, where more qualified officials are often overlooked, the ANC's party loyalists tend to get the nod, as a result impeding service delivery in South Africa. To date, consequence management systems within the government have not been adequate. This has been evident by reports where government tender procurement systems would be manipulated to serve those

near ministers or officials from the ruling party. Regrettably government officials have been exempted from any form of lifestyle audit for the longest time.

Sadly, state-owned entities and other government departments are also affected and are facing financial difficulties. Public-owned entities such as South African Airways and LMT Products (a subsidiary of Denel) are under business rescue, while South African Express is under provisional liquidation (Auditor General of South Africa, 2021). The Auditor General Kimi Makwetu mentioned that the government has misused monies meant for community development programs out of neglect, inefficiencies, or poor decision-making. The separation of party politics from governance is crucial for the betterment of service delivery in the country. The central argument in this paper is that corruption and cadre deployment have hindered effective governance and effective service delivery, thus the domino effect has been under development and the inaccessibility of basic services for the people.

C. Theoretical Support

To ensure an effective and efficient public sector, is it important to separate politics and administration. In essence, administrative decisions taken in the public sector need to be free of political interference. However, Svara (2008) argues that in many developing regions, the public sector is intertwined with politics, often resulting in corruption and political decisions replacing administrative ones. This paper applies the politics-administration dichotomy theory. In his essay titled Svara (2008), former US president Woodrow Wilson argued that administration as a field of business must be removed from the hurry and strife of politics (Stillman, 1973). While this paper acknowledges that there are other theories such as the Postmodern Public Administration Theory, bureaucratic theory, and new public management theory, however, these theories do not distinguish between the need to separate politics from administration, rather they dwell on the processes and how to ensure an effective and efficient public service, hence the justification of the use of politics-administration dichotomy theory. Moreover, the topic under study dwells greatly on the need to separate politics from administration, hence, the theory and its assumption speak to the topic under study. However, Jison (2018) reflects that despite several clarion calls from staunch advocates, the field of public administration remained to be a subfield of political science during the 1950–1970s and still does so even today. Wilson argued that there is a great need to differentiate between politics from administration, the field of politics aims to answer the question, "Who shall make law and what shall it be?" While administration attempts to address the question, "How should the law be administered? Supporting this, Frank Goodnow, an American legal scholar, argued that while politics has something to do with policies or expressions of the state's will, administration has to do with the execution of such policies. Wilson and Goodnow made clear that politics is limited to the crafting of policies and lawmaking, a function generally vested on

a State's legislative body, and administration is focused on the implementation of laws, a function normally held by the State's executive branch (Jison, 2018).

The failure to separate politics from administration allows elites to pursue hidden agendas using public resources, and such action tends not to represent the interests of the people but those of the ruling class. However, there is a need to debunk the notion that politics and administration are only intertwined in the developing regions. Developed countries are also characterized by an overlap of politics into administration, however, there are institutions and regulations which safeguard and prevent the interference of politics into the functioning of the public sector, this is not the case for many developing countries where such institutions have been politically compromised (Dasandi and Esteve, 2017). While Jison (2018) agrees that there is a need to separate politics from administration, the author notes that defining the relationship between politics and administration is still of great significance to the development of public administration in theory and practice. Noteworthy is that considerable criticisms leveled against the ANC's deployment policy has been premised on the notion that it compromises the credibility of the public sector, eliminates room for transparency and accountability and consolidates party loyalty over governance, and creates room for politics to influence decisions taken in the public sector. While the ANC had been steadfast in its support for the policy, not all within the organization support the way the policy is used. ANC stalwart Mavuso Msimang communicated that cadre deployment by the governing party may have started with noble intentions but morphed into a vehicle of state capture and led to the plunder of public resources (Magubane, 2021). It has become a vehicle to loot the public purse and drive the interests of a few. Echoing the above, Modimowabarwa Kanyane, a researcher at the human sciences research council, argued that the ANC's deployment strategy systematically places loyalty ahead of merit and even of competence and is, therefore, a serious obstacle to efficient public service (Areff, 2012). For Kanyane, politically connected incompetent people were often deployed to public positions, which led to a demoralized public service. This paper argues that the ANC's cadre deployment policy has given rise to ANC internal politics infiltrating the administrative capacity of the public sector. Even though the ANC has acknowledged the flaws in their cadre policy, not all people deployed by the ANC are incompetent. Even though one cannot blame the ANC for the incompetent workforce in the public sector, there is a need for ANC to revisit the policy due to widespread allegations of corruption, interference in the functioning of the public sector, and the general public discontent. This paper does not support nor refute the cadre deployment policy of the ANC but argues that it has blurred the thin lines between politics as a separate action and administration of the public sector as another action. While this theory has contributed to the understanding of public administration, Jison (2018) argues that the difference between politics and administration is really hard to tell as the former heavily influences the latter, or vice versa and even Wilson himself

argued that the dichotomy of the two is fictional. However, this paper concludes that the less influence politics has on administration, the more likely to a strong public service underpinned by good governance and constitutionalism.

D. The Future of Service Delivery in the Face of Cadre Deployment

According to Reddy (2016), fiscal responsibility and poor political leadership are incompatible. The financial health of municipalities will remain grim as long as "cadre deployment" is used and municipalities are obliged to practice financial restraint. It is clear that cadre deployment does not promote efficient use of public resources; this is due to the poor leadership and lack of strategic focus that cadre deployment creates. Individuals are promoted to strategic positions simply because they are loyalists of the ruling party, and these individuals do not practice fiscal responsibility. This has a huge influence on South Africa's ability to supply long-term public services. For Sebake and Sebola (2014), in the South African public sector, cadre deployment has clearly resulted in inadequate performance, mismanagement, and poor service delivery. So far, it appears that it has paved the way for malpractice in the hiring of public officials, promoting nepotism, favoritism, and inadequate service standards. Senior posts were commonly given with decreased qualifications to accommodate unworthy individuals who were politically identified, hence promoting nepotism in the workplace. This was done to accommodate the candidates of preference, irrespective of the nature of the post's obligations. These findings show that cadre deployment in South Africa does not prioritize effective and efficient service delivery; no government organization can promote efficient service delivery while the South African public sector continues to struggle with poor performance and mismanagement as a result of cadre deployment, which is still in use today. Masuku and Jili (2019) stated that South Africa is in serious jeopardy of the ruling party (ANC) choosing and employing cadres within municipalities, which is an indication that politicians are abusing their authority. Since they do not use a merit system to pick employees, the degree of risk in local government is enormous. Since this strategy does not assess whether persons allocated to crucial roles are capable or not based on their merits, effective service delivery in South Africa is in jeopardy.

Shava and Chamisa (2018) expound that poor supply chain methods, inefficient spending, and the deteriorating status of local government are all consequences of cadre deployment. The fact that cadre deployment is generating poor procurement procedures and wasteful expenditure is a serious threat to public finances in South Africa, and if cadre deployment harms public funds, service delivery would suffer. According to Thebe (2017), the deployment of cadres has developed party leadership structures and given political leaders considerable power, resulting in instances where such leaders are unwilling or unable to hold public officials accountable. The South African public

sector faces numerous challenges today as a result of cadre deployment and the support of the dominant political party, which causes public office bearers to behave in a manner that harms public service delivery. Penxa (2018) stated that public accountability is a method in which the public holds the government accountable for its plans of execution by demanding clarifications, reasons, and, if required, corrective action. Holding public office bearers responsible for public and legislative entities in South Africa are important for activating democracy. In the South Africa, office bearers are rarely held responsible for their conduct, which has a detrimental influence on sustainable public service delivery. Nkomo (2017) indicated that in several South African government entities, public accountability for service delivery is seen as insufficient. Although access to services has improved overtime, protestors' demands are generally focused on the poor quality of such services. For Petersen (2020), the deployment of cadres to crucial positions and the blurring of reporting lines have encouraged some corrupt tendencies, resulting in the loss of accountability, transparency, and government efficiency. Accountability, openness, and efficient governance are all essential for responsive public service delivery, but cadre deployment in South Africa undermines these principles. Cadre deployment is solely for those in power, not for the general population, which hurts public service delivery.

III. Methodology

This paper employed that a qualitative research approach was adopted to enable the use of secondary data literature. The purpose of this approach was to broaden the understanding of the concept of cadre deployment, its influence on good governance and accountability. Furthermore, there have been studies (Twala, 2014; Tshishonga, 2014; Kok, 2017) undertaken to understand the increasing emphasis being put on the need for the ANC to do away with cadre deployment, citing the adverse implication it has on good governance and accountability. Therefore, the vast availability of literature and the employed research approach will allow the paper to draw a meaningful conclusion. Databases such as Scopus, IBSS, DOAJ, and Web of Science were used to search for the relevant information. Key words such as deployment, ANC, public sector, and corruption were employed to help synthesize the data gathered.

IV. Discussion

The delivery of effective and efficient public services is dependent on competent and skilled public officials. Cadre deployment weakens this vital need since it prefers party loyalty over adherence to good governance and the rule of law. According to Fakir (2007), it is obvious that the proper execution of the post-apartheid state's reoriented public service would necessitate public workers who are professional, skilled, and adequately compensated. However, public employees, particularly those in developing

countries, must recognize that they are ultimately servants of the people, and they must be imaginative and quick in responding to fundamental public requests/issues. Nomarwayi et al. (2020) clarified that cadre deployment has a detrimental influence on service delivery since those in crucial positions are not competent to hold those positions but are just politically connected. Corruption has grown in South Africa and cadre deployment has, directly and indirectly, contributed to this. Political appointees are not chosen based on their abilities, experiences, or academic credentials. To address this, there is a need for the implementation of checks and balances in the public sector that would be serve as a possible deterrent to possible abuse by politicians. Moreover, there is a need for legislation that will determine the skills, experiences, and qualifications one needs to hold particular positions in the public sector, however for such legislation to the effective, it will depend on the amount of political support it can garner. Cadre deployment imposes a strain on government resources by necessitating the creation of new vacancies to satisfy "comrades," using funds that could otherwise be allocated for service delivery. Mngomezulu (2020) expounds that the ANC's cadre deployment strategy, which supports the idea that people should be hired based on their devotion and lengthy service to the organization, has a negative influence on service delivery since it employs inept and unqualified workers who fail to execute their jobs. According to Ngcamu (2019), local communities in South Africa are unsatisfied with municipal services as a result of the appointment of untrained, unqualified, and inexperienced cadres to municipal managerial posts, which have harmed municipalities. The deployment of cadres in local government fosters corruption and maladministration, which have harmed the image of local government, as seen by the numerous service delivery demonstrations that have occurred in South African communities. Mdlongwa (2014) indicated that citizens have been upset by the poor service delivery and by corrupt practices that have grown endemic in some municipalities, which has resulted in an increase in the frequency of violent service delivery demonstrations around the country in recent years. According to Pithouse (2009), poor service delivery, corruption, favoritism, mismanagement, and low productivity have been blamed for violent service delivery demonstrations at the municipal level. Breakfast et al. (2019) illustrated that poor service delivery and a lack of responsibility on the part of local politicians and municipal authorities exacerbate demonstrations and violent protests. Corruption, bad financial management, and cadre deployment, particularly among those associated with the ruling party (the ANC), aggravate the poor's suffering or the absence of service delivery in disadvantaged communities. South Africa is now holding a multitude of commissions on corruption and poor governance in response to the government's failure to provide essential services to the people. A study by Chamisa and Chava (2018) found that cadre deployment reduces the effectives of the public sector as those deployed tend to focus on the parties mandate rather than ensuring effective

governance and service delivery. Hoffman (2013) asserted that if the haphazard way in which cadre deployment is implemented is not addressed, it risks affecting the competitiveness of the public sector. These studies reinforce the notion that cadre deployment affects governance and the credibility of the public sector.

V. Conclusion

The cadre deployment approach has had a detrimental influence on governance and service delivery. This is because the ANC's cadre deployment policy has filled the government entities with inexperienced political office bearers who are more concerned with personal interests than with public service delivery. The ANC must ensure that the political office bearers have the necessary competencies and are academically deserving of these positions. To foster good governance and remove corruption and maladministration, the ANC government must implement a monitoring and assessment method for its cadre deployment policy. The aim of this paper was to reflect on the ongoing debate around cadre deployment and governance in South Africa. The paper compared and contrasted the different viewpoints in the literature to further comprehend the understanding of cadre deployment and governance. The findings of this paper further consolidated the view that while there is a need to separate politics from administrative decisions, without proper checks and balances in the public sector, politicians will continue to influence administrative decisions and this will have wider implications for society at large. Going forward it is important that the public sector and governance processes are protected from political interference; this can be done by improving the current checks and balances and through legislation.

VI. Acknowledgments

References

Areff, A. (2012). *ANC Cadre Deployment "Drags Down Public Services"*. Available from: https://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-12-anc-cadre-deployment. [Last accessed on 2021 May 19].

Auditor General of South Africa. (2021). *Auditor-General Calls on Government Leaders to Ensure "Sustainable" Audit Outcomes*. Available from: https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/PFMA/201920/2021%20PFMA%20Media%20Release%20FINALISED%202.pdf. [Last accessed on 2021 May 09].

Bauer, C. (2000). Public sector corruption and its control in South Africa. In: *Corruption and Development in Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p218-233.

BBC News. (2019). *South Africa Elections: Has the ANC Built Enough Homes*? Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48093711. [Last accessed on 2021 May 09].

Bouckaert, P.N. (1997). The negotiated revolution: South Africa's transition to a multiracial democracy. *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 33, 375.

Breakfast, N., Bradshaw, G., & Nomarwayi, T. (2019). Violent service delivery protests in post-apartheid South Africa, 1994-2017-a conflict resolution

perspective. *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 11(1), 106-126.

Brown, M.J., & Roman, N. (2019). *Primary Caregivers Perceptions of the Role of Fathers in the Provision of Nutritional Care in a Resource Constrained Environment in Cape Town, South Africa*. Available from: https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs-4675/v1. [Last accessed on 2021 Jun 16].

Chamisa, S.F., & Chava, E. (2018). Cadre deployment policy and its effects on performance management in South African local government: A critical review. *Politeia*, 37(1), 3849.

Cheeseman, N., Bertrand, E., & Husaini, S. (2019), *"Cadre Deployment", a Dictionary of African Politics*. Available from: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=edsoro&AN=oro.9780191828836.013.0066&site=eds-live. [Last accessed on 2021 Jun 20].

Dasandi, N., & Esteve, M. (2017). The politics-bureaucracy interface in developing countries. *Public Administration and Development*, 37(4), 231-245.

du Toit, P., & de Jager, N. (2014). South Africa's dominant-party system in comparative perspective. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 10(2), 93-113.

Fakir, E. (2007). *Public Service Delivery in a Democratic, Developmental State*. Available from: https://gsdrc.org/document-library/public-service-delivery-in-a-democratic-developmental-state. [Last accessed on 2021 Jul 09].

Hoffman, P. (2013). Service delivery: Constraints, corruption and cadres. In: Plaatjies, D., editor. *Protecting the Inheritance: Governance and Public Accountability in Democratic South Africa*. Sunnyside: Jacana Media.

Jankielsohn, R., & Mollentze, S. (2021). The national democratic revolution as an ideological instrument for transformation in South Africa. *Eximia*, 1(1), 1-18.

Jison, J. (2018). *The Dichotomy of Politics and Public Administration: Lessons from the Perennial Debate*. Available from: https://www.iapss.org/2014/06/30/the-dichotomy-of-politics-and-public-administration-lessons-from-the-perennial-debate. [Last accessed on 2021 Oct 15].

Kanyane, M. (2014). Exploring challenges of municipal service delivery in South Africa (1994-2013). *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, 2(1), 90-110.

Kok, L. (2017). *Roadmap for Effective and Efficient Cadre Deployment in South Africa*. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3026392. [Last accessed on 2021 Aug 07].

Magomane, T. (2012). The Impact of Cadre Deployment On Service Delivery: The Case of Mopani Local Municipalities in Limpopo Province. Master's thesis, Governance and Political Transformation, South Africa.

Magubane, J. (2021). *Cadre Deployment was a "Disaster", says ANC Veteran*. Available from: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/cadre-deployment-was-a-disaster-says-anc-veteran-20210805. [Last accessed on 2021 Sep 15].

Mantzaris, E.A. (2017). Trends, realities and corruption in supply chain management: South Africa and India. *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 9(8), 121-134.

Masuku, M.M., & Jili, N.N. (2019). Public service delivery in South Africa: The political influence at local government level. Journal of Public Affairs, 19(4), e1935

Masuku, M.M., Jili, N.N. (2019). Public service delivery in South Africa: The political influence at local government level. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 19(4), p.e1935.

Mavuso, B. (2020). *Another State-owned Enterprise Collapses are we Learning Anything*? Available from: https://mg.co.za/analysis/2020-02-24-another-state-owned-enterprise-collapses-are-we-learning-anything. [Last accessed on 2021 Nov 03].

Mdlongwa, E.T. (2014). Local government at the heart of poor service delivery. *Rhodes Journalism Review*, 34, 39.

Miller, D., Saunders, R., & Oloyede, O. (2008). South African corporations and post-apartheid expansion in Africa-creating a new regional space. *African Sociological Review*, 12(1), 1-19.

Mkhongi, B. (2013). Build the Cadre for the National Democratic Revolution. Available from: https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/services/Download/uj:42589/source1 [Last accessed on 2022 Jan 09].

Mngomezulu, S. (2020). Political interference in the administration of service delivery in Umlalazi local municipality of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. *Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies*, 12(1), 38-45.

Ngcamu, B.S. (2019). Exploring service delivery protests in post-apartheid South African municipalities: A literature review. *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa*, 15(1), 9.

Nkomo, S. (2017). *Public Service Delivery in South Africa: Councillors and Citizens Critical Links in Overcoming Persistent Inequities. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 42*. Available from: https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ab_policypaperno42_local_service_delivery_in_southafrica.pdf. [Last accessed on 2021 Sep 09].

Nomarwayi, T., Bradshaw, G., & Breakfast, N.B. (2020). Violent service delivery protests in the Nelson Mandela bay municipality (Nmbm): A case study of Walmer Township. *Gender and Behaviour*, 18(1), 1-16.

Pattillo, K.M.C. (2012). *Quiet Corruption: Teachers' Unions and Leadership in South African*. Honors Theses.

Penxa, L. (2016). *Civil Society and Public Accountability: The Need for Active Monitoring*. Available from: http://psam.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Civil-Society-and-Public-Accountability.pdf. [Last accessed on 2021 Oct 06].

Petersen, S. (2020). Does a Dominant Party Democracy Erode Constitutional Legitimacy? In: *An Analysis of the African National Congress and the South African constitution* (*Master's Thesis, Faculty of Law*).

Pithouse, R. (2009), Abahlali base Mjondolo and the struggle for the city in Durban, South Africa. *Cidades*, 6(9), 241-270.

Pring, C., & Vrushi, J. (2019). *Global Corruption Barometer: Africa 2019. Transparency International*. Available from: https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/gcb-africa-2019. [Last accessed on 2021 Sep 09].

Qobo, M. (2019). *Party and State in South Africa*. Available from: https://media.africaportal.org/documents/CDE-VIEWPOINTS-Party-and-State-in-South-Africa-final.pdf. [Last accessed on 2021 Sep 09].

Reddy, P.S. (2016). The politics of service delivery in South Africa: The local government sphere in context. *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa*, 12(1), 1-8.

Resane, K.T. (2021). White fragility, white supremacy and white normativity make theological dialogue on race difficult. *In Skriflig*, 55(1), 2661.

Sebake, B.K., & Sebola, M.P. (2014). Growing trends and tendencies of corruption in the South African public service: Negative contribution to service delivery. *Journal of Public Administration*, 49(3), 744-755.

Shava, E., & Chamisa, S.F. (2018). Cadre deployment policy and its effects on prmance management in South African local government: A critical review. *Politeia*, 37(1), 3849.

South African Government. (2014). *GDE Reviews 20 Years of Public Schooling in Gauteng*. Available from: https://www.gov.za/gde-reviews-20-years-public-schooling-gauteng. [Last accessed on 2021 Aug 16].

South African News. (2014). *More South Africans in Higher Education*. Available from: https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/more-south-africans-higher-education. [Last accessed on 2021 Aug 19].

Stillman, R.J. (1973). Woodrow Wilson and the study of administration: A new look at an old essay. *American Political Science Review*, 67(2), 582-588.

Svara, J.H. (2008). Beyond dichotomy: Dwight Waldo and the intertwined politics-administration relationship. *Public Administration Review*, 68(1), 46-52.

Thebe. (2017). Political education for good governance in South Africa's local government and communities. *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 9(5), 123-135.

Tickle, D. (2018). Country note: "Irregular" and "wasteful" expenditure, tax, and fiscal citizenship in South Africa. *Intertax*, 46(3), 252-260.

Tshishonga, N. (2014). Cadre deployment and its implications on service delivery in South Africa: A human development capability approach. *Journal of Public Administration*, 49(3), 891-908.

Twala, C. (2014). The African National Congress (ANC) and the cadre deployment policy in the postapartheid South Africa: A product of democratic centralisation or a recipe for a constitutional crisis? *Journal of Social Sciences*, 41(2), 159-165.